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DYNAMIC POWER ALLOCATION GAMES IN
PARALLEL MULTIPLE ACCESS CHANNELS
PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS, ELENA V. BELMEGA, ARIS L. MOUSTAKAS,
AND SAMSON LASAULCE
Abstract. We analyze the distributed power allocation problem in parallel
multiple access channels (MAC) by studying an associated non-cooperative
game which admits an exact potential function. Even though games of this
type have been the subject of considerable study in the literature [1–4], we
find that the sufficient conditions which ensure uniqueness of Nash equilib-
rium points typically do not hold in this context. Nonetheless, we show that
the parallel MAC game admits a unique equilibrium almost surely, thus estab-
lishing an important class of counterexamples where these sufficient conditions
are not necessary. Furthermore, if the network’s users employ a distributed
learning scheme based on the replicator dynamics, we show that they converge
to equilibrium from almost any initial condition, even though users only have
local information at their disposal.
1. Introduction
As a result of the massive scale at which wireless networks are deployed and
operate, non-cooperative game theory is rapidly becoming one of the main tools
with which to describe and analyze distributed resource allocation problems in this
context. The reason for this is simple: whereas solution concepts and centralized
optimization protocols which depend on global information are very hard to justify
or implement (especially in real time or in the presence of a large number of users),
game theory offers a way to look at the problem from a more distributed and
localized point of view which is often of great applicational relevance.
A prime example of this can be seen in the huge corpus of literature surrounding
power allocation games in static Gaussian multi-user networks with the objec-
tive of reaching a Shannon-efficient state. The common characteristic of all these
games is that the interference between multiple transmissions gives rise to non-
trivial interactions between transmitters and imposes a bottleneck on the network
performance: interference forces the power allocation policy of one user to depend
on the power allocations of all other users. So, following [5], and given that the
network users are left to optimally manage their resources on their own, the main
questions that arise are a) whether there exist “equilibrial” allocations which are
stable against unilateral deviations; b) whether these (Nash) equilibria are unique;
and c) whether these equilibria can be reached by distributed (learning) algorithms
which require only local information.
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The two most important multi-user network models that have been studied from
this perspective are the interference channel (IC) [6] and the multiple access chan-
nel (MAC) [7], two models which are inherently different from a communications
point of view. On the one hand, the IC is composed of several non-cooperative
transmitter-receiver pairs and the information-theoretic capacity region is still an
open issue for this channel model; in fact, even in the simple case of single-input,
single-output (SISO) two-user Gaussian IC only the achievable rates are known
[6, 8, 9]. On the other hand, the MAC is composed of several transmitters and a
single receiver which must decode the incoming messages, and its capacity region
is relatively well-understood [10–12], something which remains an open problem
for the IC.
Perhaps the most general non-cooperative power allocation games studied in
the context of static channels are those presented by Scutari et al. in a series of
seminal papers [1–4] focusing on the static Gaussian IC where receivers employ the
single-user decoding (SUD) scheme which treats incoming signals from other users
as additive noise. There, the existence of a Nash equilibrium (in the “pure” sense
of Rosen) is a consequence of the convexity properties of the users’ achievable rates
and follows directly from Theorem 1 in [13]; in fact, under suitable (but stringent)
conditions on the channel matrices, this equilibrium solution is unique.
Unfortunately, there are two issues with the approach of Scutari et al.: first,
as the authors themselves admit, these sufficient conditions “may not be easy to
check” [14, p. 1925] and, indeed, in most cases they are not (calculating the spectral
radius of a matrix is very hard for large matrices). Secondly, these conditions
are not necessary, so when they fail, the uniqueness issue is left wide open. In
the specific case of two-user parallel IC, some progress has been made in [15],
where the authors completely characterize the set of Nash equilibria. Depending
on the geometric properties of the best-response functions (which are identical to
the water-filling operators of [3]), the power allocation game may have one, two,
three or an infinite number of Nash equilibria. Finally, in [16], assuming that the
interference links in one of the bands are negligible, the game is shown to have
strategic complementarities and the Nash set is studied using the super-modular
property of the game.
A most interesting special case of these more general games consists of the paral-
lel MAC power allocation games which are used to model uplink communication in
multi-cellular wireless networks composed of several nodes (receivers, access points,
base stations, etc.) that operate in orthogonal frequency bands. From a mathe-
matical point of view, the results of [3] obviously apply to the MAC as well, but,
as we shall see, the sufficient conditions of [4] are never met in the parallel MAC
case, making them irrelevant to games of this type. To compensate for this, the
authors of [17] considered two different power allocation games in parallel multiple
access channels, depending on the users’ action sets: i) the users may distribute
their available power among the wireless nodes; or ii) the users simply choose a
node. There, for the first game (which is more relevant for realistic power allocation
scenaria), the Nash equilibrium is argued to be unique, but the proof provided in
[17] actually holds only under very restrictive conditions (otherwise, the authors’
strict convexity arguments break down).
In this paper, we analyze non-cooperative power allocation games in parallel mul-
tiple access channels with the standard assumption of single user decoding (SUD)
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at the receiver.1 As in the more general MIMO MAC case, the parallel MAC game
admits an exact potential (in the sense of [20]) whose extrema correspond to the
system’s sum capacity, and which can also be interpreted as the system achievable
sum-rate if users were employing successive interference cancellation (SIC). Since
this potential function is convex, the game’s Nash equilibria will correspond to the
minima of the potential, so the game’s Nash set is necessarily convex and compact.
However, we find that the game’s potential is, in general, not strictly convex (this
was the mistake of [17]), so one would expect that uniqueness of Nash equilibria
fails along with the sufficient conditions of [4]. Rather surprisingly, we find that this
is not the case: even though the conditions of [4] do not hold, the Nash equilibrium
of the game is unique (a.s.).
As far as convergence to equilibrium is concerned, one of the main results of [21]
is that if the transmitters know the local channel state and the overall interference-
plus-noise covariance matrix, then the iterative sequential water-filling algorithm
converges to the set of equilibrium points. On the other hand, asynchronous water-
filling is harder to analyze because the sufficient conditions of [3] are typically not
satisfied in the parallel MAC case. Finally, in a setting similar to our own (in-
corporating pricing but restricted to only one receiver), the authors of [22] have
considered update algorithms which converge to equilibrium modulo certain condi-
tions which do not always hold either.
Instead of taking a water-filling approach, we present a learning scheme based
on the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory [23] which only requires
the players to know their channel coefficients and their rates. Dynamics of this sort
have been studied extensively in finite Nash games ( that is, games with multilinear
payoff functions over a strategy space which is a product of simplices – see e.g. [24]
for a survey) and in continuous population games [23, 25], but, in the case of finite
nonlinear games (such as the one we have here), their properties are not as well
understood. The first step in that direction consists of identifying the correct
modified version of the users’ payoff functions which allows the replicator dynamics
to behave well with respect to the solution concepts of the underlying game – in
more “traditional” finite player games, this purpose is served by the payoffs that
correspond to the pure strategies of the game, but here we have no such structure.
Our main contribution is to then show that in parallel MAC power allocation games,
the replicator dynamics converge to an equilibrium point unconditionally, even in
the zero-probability event where the game has multiple equilibria.
Notational Conventions. Throughout this paper, we will use bold uppercase
letters to denote matrices and a dagger “†” to denote the Hermitian transpose of a
complex matrix.
If S = {sα}nα=1 is a finite set, we will denote by KS the disjoint union (categor-
ical coproduct) KS ≡ ∐Kk=1 S of K copies of S. Also, recall that the (real) vector
space spanned by S is defined as the space RS ≡ Hom(S,R) of functions x : S→ R,
equipped with the usual operations of addition and scalar multiplication of func-
tions. The canonical basis {eα}nα=1 of RS then consists of the indicator functions
1 More efficient decoding techniques such as successive interference cancellation can also be
considered [18, 19], but optimality with respect to Shannon achievable rates will not concern
us here; instead, the low level of signalling and decoder complexity of the SUD makes it more
suitable for learning purposes. Furthermore, when using successive interference techniques, the
exact potential property of the game is lost in general.
4 P. MERTIKOPOULOS, E. V. BELMEGA, A. L. MOUSTAKAS, AND S. LASAULCE
eα : S → R which take the value eα(sα) = 1 and vanish otherwise. Hence, under
the natural identification sα 7→ eα, we will use the index α to refer interchangeably
to either sα or eα, depending on the context. Similarly, we will also identify the set
∆(S) of probability measures on S with the standard (n-1)-dimensional simplex of
RS: ∆(S) ≡ {x ∈ RS : ∑α xα = 1 and xα ≥ 0}.
Finally, as far as players and their strategies are concerned, we will consistently
employ Latin indices for players (k, `, . . .), while reserving Greek ones for their
(“pure”) strategies (α, β, . . .).
2. The System Model
Following [17], the basic setup of our model is as follows: we have a set K =
{1, . . . ,K} of finitely many wireless (single-antenna) transmitters – the players of
the game – that wish to connect to a network of wireless nodes A = {1, . . . , A}
(for instance, a collection of base stations or access points). For simplicity, we are
assuming that these nodes operate at distinct, non-interfering frequency bands, so
that a user k ∈ K may split his transmitting power among the nodes α ∈ A subject
to the power constraint:
(1)
∑
α
pkα ≤ Pk,
where pkα is the power with which user k transmits towards node α and Pk is
the user’s maximum transmitting power. As a result, the power allocation of the
k-th user will be represented by the point pk =
∑
α pkαeα ∈ RA, while, in obvious
notation, the corresponding power profile which collectively reflects all of the users’
power allocations will be represented by p = (p1, . . . , pK) ∈ RKA.
Thus, under the standard assumption of single user decoding (SUD), the spectral
efficiency of user k in the power profile p will be given by [17, 22]:
(2) uk(p) =
∑
α∈A
ukα(p) =
∑
α∈A
bα log
(
1 +
gkαpkα
σ2α +
∑
` 6=k g`αp`α
)
,
where:
(1) bα = Bα/B > 0 is a normalized version of the bandwidth Bα of the node
α ∈ A, rescaled to unity by the total bandwidth factor B = ∑αBα.
(2) gkα > 0 is the channel gain of user k with respect to node α, assumed
here to be static for the duration of the transmission, known to user k, and
drawn from a continuous (and nonatomic) probability distribution on the
positive real numbers – see also the relevant assumptions in [3, 14].
(3) σ2α > 0 represents the noise level associated to node α (typically the variance
of a Gaussian noise process).
Remark 1. It should be noted here that when the wireless users are spatially dis-
tributed, the set A of wireless nodes need not be common to all users. As it turns
out, it is not too hard to extend our analysis and results to this more general case,
but, to keep our presentation as clear as possible, we will only consider the case
where every user can reach every node.
Remark 2. We should also stress here that the channel gain coefficients gkα are the
only stochastic parameters in our model, and, in our static channel setting, they
are given by gkα = |hkα|2, where h is a realization of the continuous random matrix
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which describes the channel – see also [17]. So, unless explicitly mentioned other-
wise, any probabilistic statement we make in this paper will refer to the probability
law of the random variables gkα.
Now, as intuition would suggest (and as was shown rigorously in [17]), when the
users’ utility is based solely on their spectral efficiency (2), it is clearly to the users’
best interest to transmit at the highest possible total power, i.e. satisfying (1) as
an equality.2 As a result, we obtain the following components of a normal form
game G:
(1) The set of players of G is K = {1, . . . ,K}.
(2) The strategy space of player k is the (scaled) simplex ∆k ≡ {pk ∈ RA :
pkα ≥ 0 and
∑
α pkα = Pk}; as is customary, we will denote the game’s
space of strategy profiles p = (p1, . . . , pK) by ∆ ≡
∏
k ∆k.
(3) The players’ payoffs (or utilities) are given by the spectral efficiencies uk :
∆→ R of (2).
Of course, the game G defined in this way is not finite (in the original sense of
[26]) because a) the players are not mixing over a finite set of possible actions; and
b) even though the players’ strategy spaces happen to be simplices, their payoffs
are not multilinear over them. On the other hand, since ∆ is a convex polytope and
the utilities uk of the users are concave functions of their power allocations pk, we
immediately see that the game G is concave in the sense of Rosen [13]. Moreover,
it was shown in [17] that G is actually an exact potential game,3 i.e. that it admits
a (global) potential function Φ : ∆→ R such that:
(3) uk(p−k; p′k)− uk(p−k; pk) = Φ(p−k; pk)− Φ(p−k; p′k),
for all players k ∈ K, and for all power allocations pk, p′k ∈ ∆k of user k and
p−k ∈ ∆−k ≡
∏
` 6=k ∆` of k’s opponents K−k ≡ K \{k}.4
In fact, the authors of [17] provided the following explicit form for the potential
function Φ:
(4) Φ(p) = −
∑
α
bα log
(
σ2α +
∑
k
gkαpkα
)
.
For posterity, note here that Φ is itself convex, but not necessarily strictly so:5
indeed, any two power profiles p, p′ ∈ ∆ such that ∑k gkαpkα = ∑k gkαp′kα for
all α ∈ A will also have Φ(p) = Φ(p′). This simple observation will be of crucial
importance in determining the Nash set of the game, so we will pause here to
introduce the concept of degeneracy.
To that end, let Tp∆ denote the tangent space of ∆ at p. Since ∆ is an affine
polytope embedded in RKA, it is easy to see that for every interior point p ∈ Int(∆),
Tp∆ will be isomorphic to the subspace which is “parallel” to the polytope ∆:
(5) Tp∆ ∼= Z =
{
z ∈ RKA : ∑α zkα = 0 for all k ∈ K} .
2Of course, this need not be true if the cost of power consumption is too high [22], but we will
not deal with this issue here.
3In the finite player sense of Monderer and Shapley [20], and not in the continuous sense of
[25].
4The change of signs in (3) from [20] is deliberate. Our convention was chosen so as to conform
with physics, where it is the minima of the potential function that are stable.
5This is precisely the subtle mistake that underlies the equilibrium uniqueness argumentation
of [17].
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(a) ind(G) = 0: generic level sets
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(b) ind(G) > 0: degeneration into affine sets
Figure 1. The level sets (dashed blue lines) of the potential func-
tion Φ in a 2 × 2 game with and without degenerate directions
(Figs. 1(b) and 1(a) respectively). Degeneracy nullifies degrees of
freedom and introduces redundant directions in the system.
However, as we just noted, some of these KA−K directions will be degenerate (or
redundant), in the sense that the potential Φ remains constant as we move along
them. Specifically, the set of (almost surely independent) constraints
(6)
∑
k gkαzkα = 0, α ∈ A,
cuts itself a (KA−A)-dimensional subspace W of RKA whose intersection with Z
will correspond to the total of K +A constraints:
a)
∑
α
zkα = 0, k ∈ K;(7a)
b)
∑
k
gkαzkα = 0, α ∈ A.(7b)
Of course, the K tangent space constraints (7a) are set in stone while the A
degeneracy constraints (7b) depend on the realization of the channel gains gkα.
6 It
is thus possible (though improbable) that some of the constraints (7) are linearly
dependent. To keep track of all this, we have:
Definition 1. The subspace W ≤ RKA defined by the constraints (7b) will be
called the space of degenerate (or redundant) directions of the game G. Moreover,
we define the degeneracy (or redundancy) index of G to be:
(8) ind(G) ≡ dim(W ∩ Z),
where Z is the tangent space determined by the admissibility constraints (7a).
Example 1. As we just saw, ind(G) = KA−K−A (a.s.), so there is no degeneracy
in games with K = 2 users and A = 2 nodes. However, if the channel gains of
the two users happen to be linearly dependent (a zero-probability event to be sure,
6These conditions are remarkably similar to the MIMO rank condition rank(H†H) =∑K
k=1 nt,k ≤ nr + K (where H = [H1, . . . ,HK ] is the system’s channel matrix) which ensures
that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium [27].
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but one which could be approximated reasonably well by strongly collocated users),
then we can have degenerate directions even in a 2 × 2 game (see Fig. 2). In that
case, the potential function Φ ceases to be strictly convex, so there is no a priori
reason that the potential’s minimum set will be a singleton.
3. Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, our main goal will be to describe the Nash set of the game and,
more specifically, to show that it consists (almost surely) of a unique equilibrium
point which is located at a face of the strategy space ∆.
This problem has attracted considerable interest in the literature, where the
papers by Scutari et al. [1–4] provide a set of sufficient conditions for uniqueness in
more general interference channel scenaria, and, more recently, in [17], where the
authors focus on the parallel MAC problem. Unfortunately, these approaches are
problematic (for different reasons): on the one hand, we will see that the sufficient
conditions of Scutari et al. [1–4] do not hold in our setting; on the other hand, the
uniqueness proof of [17] is only valid under the extremely restricting condition that
the game is non-degenerate, i.e. that KA ≤ K + A (otherwise, the potential Φ is
not strictly convex).
Indeed, especially this last condition holds for very few scenarios, only one of
which is (barely) non-trivial: a) when we have K = 1 user and an arbitrary number
A ≥ 1 of nodes (in which case the problem reduces to an optimization one solved by
water-filling [28]); b) when an arbitrary number of K ≥ 1 users transmits with the
maximum possible power to a single node shared by all (A = 1; this was also the
scenario studied by [22] who also introduced a linear pricing scheme to compensate
for power costs); and c) in the 2x2 case which is easy to solve directly. In spite of
the above, our main result in this section is that the sufficient conditions of Scutari
are actually far from necessary: for (almost) any realization of the channel gain
parameters gkα, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
3.1. Nash Equilibrium Conditions. Since we have a finite number of players,
the notion of Nash equilibrium takes the form of stability in the face of unilateral
deviations. More specifically:
Definition 2. We will say that the power profile q ∈ ∆ is at Nash equilibrium in
the game G when
(9) uk(q) ≥ uk(q−k; q′k),
for all k ∈ K, and for every deviation q′k ∈ ∆k of player k.
In particular, if q satisfies the strict version of the inequalities (9), then it will
be called a strict equilibrium of G.
As is standard in convex potential games, to calculate the Nash set ∆∗ ≡ ∆∗(G)
of the game, we only need to look at the (necessarily convex) minimum set of the
potential function Φ. To that end, the first order constrained Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
minimization conditions [17] show that a power profile q ∈ ∆ will be at Nash
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equilibrium if and only if:
a) λk − bαgkα
σ2α +
∑
` g`αq`α
≥ 0(10a)
b) qkα
(
λk − bαgkα
σ2α +
∑
` g`αq`α
)
= 0,(10b)
for all players k ∈ K and all nodes α ∈ A (and with the obvious constraints imposed
by the condition q ∈ ∆).
An obvious observation that can be gleaned from the above is that if q is a Nash
equilibrium, then either a) the support supp(qk) ≡ {α ∈ A : qkα > 0} of a user’s
power allocation is a singleton (i.e. the user only transmits to a single node); or
b) we will have the “waterfilling” condition:
(11)
gkα
gkβ
=
rα
rβ
for all α, β ∈ supp(qk),
where rα is the user-independent quantity given by:
(12) r−1α ≡
bα
σ2α +
∑
` g`αq`α
.
In other words, if user k connects to more than one node and is at equilibrium, then
he must be “waterfilling” the quantity gkα/rα among the nodes that he employs.
A promising way to determine whether our game admits a unique equilibrium is
to take advantage of the plethora of sufficient conditions that have been established
in the literature for this purpose. In our setting, the condition which is easiest to
check was the one proposed by Scutari et al. in [4, Equation (21)], and which takes
the form:
(Cmax) ρ(Smax) < 1,
where ρ(Smax) = max{|λ| : λ ∈ eig(Smax)} is the spectral radius (i.e. the eigenvalue
with the largest modulus) of the K ×K matrix Smax = {Smaxk` } defined as:
(13) Smaxk` =
{
0, k = `,
maxα
{
g`α
/
gkα
}
, k 6= `.
However, since maxα{g`α/gkα} = (minα{gkα/g`α})−1 ≥ (Smax`k )−1, we imme-
diately see that the entries of Smax satisfy the inequality S
max
k` S
max
`k ≥ 1 for any
distinct pair of users k, ` ∈ K. Hence, tr(S2max) will be bounded from below by:
(14) tr(S2max) =
∑
k,`
Smaxk` S
max
`k ≥ K(K − 1),
and, by the spectral radius bounds of [29], we will have:
(15) ρ(Smax) ≥ | tr(Smax)|
S
+
√
tr(S2max)− tr(Smax)2/S
S(S − 1) ,
where S = rank(Smax).
7 However, since tr(Smax) = 0 by definition, (15) gives
ρ(Smax) ≥ 1, so the sufficient condition (Cmax) fails.
7Strictly speaking, (15) holds if S ≥ 2, but we can trivially disregard the case S < 2, because
S = K almost surely and the one-user case holds little interest.
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Other sufficient conditions were put forth in [1–3] and [30], based on the matrices
S(α) = {Sk`(α)} defined as:
(16) Sk`(α) =
{
0, k = `,
g`α/gkα, k 6= `.
In particular, it was shown in [1] that if:
(C1) ρ(S(α)) < 1 for all α ∈ A,
then the game G admits a unique Nash equilibrium; in a similar vein, the authors
of [30] proposed the condition:
(C2) I + S(α) < 0 for all α ∈ A,
where “< 0” signifies positive-definiteness.
Of these two conditions (C1) is stronger than (Cmax) in the sense that (Cmax)
is sufficient for (C1). However, the same analysis as before shows that in the case
of the S(α) matrices, (14) holds as an equality, so we still get ρ(S(α)) ≥ 1 for
all α ∈ A, causing (C1) to fail. Similarly, even though the positive-definiteness
condition (C2) is independent of (C1) and (Cmax), the definition of S(α) yields
Sk`(α) + S`k(α) ≥ 2 for all k 6= `. Consequently, the element with the largest
modulus of the symmetrized matrix I + 12 (S(α) + S
†(α)) does not lie on the main
diagonal, so the matrix I + S(α) cannot be positive-definite either.
Remark. Strictly speaking, condition (C1) was phrased in [1] in terms of a slightly
different version of the matrix S(α) where Sk`(α) = 0 whenever the channel of α
is “too bad” for either k or ` (in a sense made precise in [1]). In this more general
setup, if α is “bad” for user k, then the k-th row and k-th column of S(α) vanish,
so the bound (14) is decreased to (K − r)(K − r − 1), where r is the number of
zero rows and columns that were introduced in S(α). However, this also reduces
the rank of S(α) accordingly, so, assuming that rank(S(α)) ≥ 2, the bound (15)
still gives ρ(S(α)) ≥ 1.
Of course, this still leaves open a small window where the condition (C1) might
be salvaged – namely the rare occurence where the S(α) matrices all have rank 1
or less. However, instead of focusing on this very special case, we note that even
the extensive numerical simulations of [1] show that the sufficient condition (C1)
almost never holds in the parallel MAC setting. Indeed, if we follow [1] and assume
for simplicity that the transmitter-receiver distances are all equal (dqr = drq in
their notation), then the “normalized interlink distance” becomes equal to 1 and
Figure 1 of [1] reveals that (C1) fails almost surely.
We thus see that, despite their theoretical value, the sufficient conditions that
have been established in the literature are quite problematic in the parallel MAC
setting because they are typically never met (except possibly in some very special
cases). Therefore, in order to address the uniqueness issue in complete generality,
we will need to develop a different set of tools.
3.2. Representing Power Profiles as Graphs. As we shall see, the “waterfill-
ing” conditions (11) impose some pretty severe constraints on the structure of the
equilibrium set ∆∗, because whenever a user waterfills between nodes, his channel
gains must “split”, i.e. be of the form gkα = λkrα. This is actually best understood
pictorially, by representing a power profile p ∈ ∆ as a graph:
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Definition 3. We will say that the (multi)graph G ≡ (V,E) represents the power
profile p = (p1, . . . , pK) ∈ ∆ if:
(1) V = A: the nodes of G coincide with the network’s;
(2) for each k ∈ K, there is a node α ∈ A (called the hub of user k in G) to
which the user assigns positive power pkα > 0, and which is joined by an
edge of G to every other node β ∈ supp(pk) \{α}.
In simpler words, to represent a power profile p ∈ ∆ as a graph, one merely has
to take the set of wireless nodes as the set of the graph’s nodes, and then, for every
user k ∈ K, to pick a node which the user employs and connect it with an edge to
every other node to which the user assigns positive power. Of course, depending
on the choice of “hub” for each user k ∈ K, one might end up with non-isomorphic
graphs representing the same power profile p. However, this lack of uniqueness will
not be important to us, so we will occasionally abuse Definition 3 by using G(p) to
collectively denote any graph which represents the profile p ∈ ∆.
In light of the above, we now state a few key lemmas and corollaries that will
be crucial in our efforts to understand the structure of the equilibrial set ∆∗. The
first one is an elegant structural property of equilibrial graphs:
Lemma 4. Let G ≡ G(p) represent a power profile p ∈ ∆∗ which is at Nash equi-
librium. Then G is almost surely a forest – that is, G contains no cycles.
Proof. The intuitive idea behind this lemma is that if there is a cycle, then we can
get a chain of fractions gk1,α1/gk0,α0 , gk2,α2/gk2,α1 , . . . , which will have a product
equal to 1 because of the waterfilling condition (11). However, this represents a
condition on the g’s which occurs with zero probability, thus providing a contra-
diction.
To make this idea precise, assume that G contains a cycle Γ denoted as a sequence
of edges Γ = (e1, . . . , en).
8 Since an edge can only be owned by a single player, this
cycle gives rise to a sequence of players which we also denote by Γ = (k1, . . . , kn).
So, if (α0, α1, . . . , αn) is the corresponding sequence of nodes that Γ passes
through (obviously, α0 = αn), then (11) gives:
(17)
gkj ,αj
gkj ,αj−1
=
rαj
rαj−1
, for all j = {1, . . . , n}.
Therefore, multiplying these n equations together, we get:
(18)
gk1,α1
gk0,α0
· · · gkn,αn
gkn−1,αn−1
=
rα1
rα0
· · · rαn
rαn−1
= 1.
Since there are no cancellations in this last equation (recall that the nodes aj ,
j = 1, . . . , n − 1 of Γ are all distinct), it will describe a measure zero submanifold
of the space from which the channel coefficients g are drawn. As a result (18) only
holds with probability zero and, hence, the assumption that G contains a cycle is
almost surely false. 
As an easy corollary of the above lemma, we also get:
Corollary 5. If p ∈ ∆∗ is an equilibrial power profile, then there are (a.s.) at most
A− 1 instances of waterfilling (i.e. two nodes employed by the same player).
8Note that keeping track only of the nodes is not enough because two distinct edges might link
the same pair of nodes.
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α
β
γ
δ
Figure 2. A graph representing a power profile in a game with
3 users (red, blue and green) and 4 nodes (α, β, γ and δ). In the
profile represented above, the red player uses α, β and δ, blue uses
α, β and γ, and green employs β, γ and δ.
Proof. Simply note that a forest on A nodes can have at most A − 1 edges; our
result then follows by recalling that an edge in this context simply represents an
instance of waterfilling. 
From a geometrical point of view, this shows that Nash equilibria can only live
on the faces of the strategy space ∆:
Corollary 6. Let p ∈ ∆∗ be an equilibrial power profile. Then p lies in the interior
of an at most (A− 1)-dimensional face of ∆ (a.s.).
Proof. Since a user who waterfills between m nodes transmits with zero power
towards the rest of the nodes, his power allocation pk will belong to the interior
of an (m − 1)-dimensional face of ∆k. The result then follows by combining this
observation with Corollary 5. 
We thus see that the Nash set ∆∗ has to be contained in the interior of a face of
∆ of dimension at most A− 1. We will now show that ∆∗ is actually a singleton:
Theorem 7. The game G has a unique Nash equilibrium (a.s.).
Proof. The basic idea of the proof is, essentially, a geometric one. Indeed, assume
that there are two distinct equilibrial points, p and p′, sitting at the interior of some
d-dimensional face ρ of ∆. By convexity, the linear segment spanned by p and p′
will also belong to the Nash set ∆∗ which implies that this line segment must (a.s.)
lie in the subspace W of degenerate directions of the game.
In other words, we see that if there is not a unique Nash equilibrium, then the
subspace W of degenerate directions intersects nontrivially with a d-dimensional
face ρ whose interior contains an equilibrium. However, since dim(W ) = KA − A
(a.s.), Corollary 6 gives dim(ρ) + dim(W ) ≤ KA−A+A− 1 < KA. On the other
hand, it is well-known that two generic subspaces of a real vector space V intersect
nontrivially if and only if the sum of their dimensions exceeds dim(V ), so, since
∆ is embedded in RKA, we may conclude that ρ and W intersect trivially with
probability 1, a contradiction. 
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4. Convergence to Equilibrium
Having determined the properties of the game’s unique equilibrium point, our
task in this section will be to present a decentralized learning scheme which al-
lows users to converge to this equilibrium point (and to estimate the speed of this
convergence).
Given that the structure of the game G does not adhere to the (multilinear)
setting of Nash [26],9 the usual theory of evolutionary “random-matching” games
does not apply either. This leaves on a rather unclear position on how to proceed,
but since players invariably want to increase their rewards and an increase in payoff
is equivalent to a decrease in potential, we will begin by considering the directional
derivatives of the potential function Φ:
(19) vkα(p) ≡ − ∂Φ
∂pkα
=
bαgkα
σ2α +
∑
` g`αp`α
.
Clearly, if a player transmits with positive power to node α, then he will be able
to calculate the gradient vkα(p) in terms of the observables pkα (the user’s power
allocation), gkα (his channel gain coefficients), and the spectral efficiency ukα(p) =
bα log
(
1 + gkαpkα(σ
2
α +
∑
` 6=k g`αp`α)
)
of (2) which user k observes at node α.10
As a result, any learning scheme which relies only on the vkα’s will be inherently
distributed in the sense that it only requires information that is readily obtainable
by the individual players.
With all this in mind, a particularly simple scheme to follow is that of the replica-
tor dynamics [23] associated with the “marginal payoffs” vkα. More specifically, this
means that the players update their power allocations according to the differential
equation:
(20)
dpkα
dt
= pkα
(
vkα(p(t))− vk(p(t))
)
,
where vk is just the user average vk(p) = P
−1
k
∑
β pkβvkβ(p).
As usual, the rest points of (20) are characterized by the (waterfilling) property
that, for every pair of nodes α, β ∈ supp(p) to which user k allocates positive
power, we will also have vkα(p) = vkβ(p). Hence, comparing this to the KKT
conditions (10), we immediately see that the Nash equilibria of G are stationary in
the replicator equation (20). This result is well-known in finite Nash games with
multilinear payoffs [24] and in continuous population games [25], but the converse
does not hold: for instance, every vertex of ∆ is stationary in (20), so stationarity
of (20) does not imply equilibrium.
Nevertheless, only Nash equilibria can be attracting, and, in fact, they attract
almost every replicator solution orbit:
Theorem 8. Let q ∈ ∆ be the unique (a.s.) equilibrium of G. Then, every solution
orbit of the replicator dynamics (20) which begins at finite Kullback-Leibler entropy
from q will converge to it.
9Or even the continuous population models of [25]: there are no “node-specific” rewards in our
problem like the “phenotype-specific” growth rates of evolutionary biology.
10 Note that this is different from gradient techniques applied to the utility functions them-
selves, a practice which requires the utility functions to be known.
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(a) Global convergence to equilibrium
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(b) Convergence in degenerate games
Figure 3. Convergence to equilibrium in 2x2 power allocation
games (the dashed grey contours represent the level sets of the
game’s potential). If the game admits a unique equilibrium (which
is almost always the case), then this equilibrium is (almost) glob-
ally attracting (Fig. 3(a)). However, even when the game has more
than one equilibria (Fig. 3(b)), every interior replicator trajectory
converges to an equilibrium point.
Furthermore, even if the game does not admit a unique equilibrium, every interior
trajectory still converges to a Nash equilibrium (and not merely to the Nash set of
the game).
Remark. Recall that the Kullback-Leibler divergence (or relative entropy) of p with
respect to q is [23]:
(21) Hq(p) =
∑
k
Hqk(pk) =
∑
k,α
qkα log
(
qkα
/
pkα
)
.
Clearly, Hq(p) is finite if and only if pk allocates positive power pkα > 0 to all nodes
α ∈ supp(q) which are present in qk; more succinctly, the domain of Hq consists of
all power allocations which are absolutely continuous w.r.t. q.
This convergence result (proved in Appendix A) is extremely powerful because
it shows that the network’s users will eventually settle down to a stable state which
discourages unilateral deviations, even though they only have local information
at their disposal. The only case that is left open in the above theorem is what
happens if the initial K-L entropy of the solution orbit is infinite, i.e. if the users’
initial power allocation does not support all of the nodes which are present in
equilibrium. If this is the case, then the face-invariance property of the replicator
dynamics (pkα(t) = 0 iff pkα = 0) will prevent the users from settling down to a Nash
equilibrium. However, an easy analysis shows that if one takes the reduced game
where each user only has access to the nodes to which he initially allocates positive
power, then the users will actually converge to an equilibrium of this reduced game:
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Proposition 9. Let p(0) = (p1(0), . . . , pK(0)) be an initial power allocation profile
in the game G and let Ak = supp(pk(0)) ⊆ A. Then, if G0 is a reduced version of
G which is played over ∆ ≡∏k Pk∆(Ak) with payoffs
(22) u0k(p) =
∑
k∈Ak
bα log
(
1 +
gkαpkα
σ2α +
∑
` 6=k g`αp`α
)
,
the replicator dynamics (20) converge to the unique (a.s.) equilibrium of the reduced
game G0.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we studied distributed power allocation in parallel multiple access
channels, modeling e.g. the problem of uplink communication in networks that
consist of wireless receivers that operate in orthogonal frequency bands. Despite
the fact that these games are special cases of the more general framework of [1–4],
the sufficient conditions provided therein for uniqueness of equilibrium typically fail
in our case. Nonetheless, we show that the game does admit a unique equilibrium
by studying the properties of the game’s exact potential function (and correcting a
mistake of [17] in the process). Furthermore, by introducing a distributed learning
scheme based on the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory, we show
that users converge to the game’s unique (a.s.) equilibrium. This result carries
significant applicational potential because it ensures convergence to equilibrium
even in decentralized settings where the users only have access to local information
(in our case, the channel coefficients gkα and the spectral efficiencies ukα).
Since the parallel MAC game is a special case of the more general IC one, a
natural question that arises is whether our analysis extends to this more general
case as well. One immediate observation is that the convergence properties of the
replicator dynamics are still valid in general convex potential games played over
products of simplices, but since the MIMO MAC game is actually played over the
polytope of non-negative definite channel matrices with constrained trace, it is not
as easy to write a continuous-time equation there. Further directions to be explored
include the speed of convergence of the replicator dynamics to equilibrium (which
can be shown to be exponentially fast) and the robustness of the replicator dynamics
under stochastic disturbances which reflect inaccuracies in the users’ observations
(e.g. of the channel coefficients gkα). However, a disicussion of these issues would
take us too far afield (and well beyond the space limitations of this paper), so we
prefer to postpone them for the future.
Appendix A. Proof of Convergence
This appendix is devoted to the proof of Theorem 8. The basic idea will be
to show that the replicator dynamics (20) admit a Lyapunov function, i.e. a non-
negative function f : ∆ → R with f(p) = 0 if and only if p = q and such that
f˙(p) ≡∑k,α ∂f/∂pkα p˙kα < 0 for all p 6= q.
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A particularly appealing candidate is the game’s own potential function Φ. In-
deed, an easy differentiation of (4) yields ∂Φ/∂pkα = −∂uk/∂pkα, so we obtain:
dΦ
dt
= −
∑
k,α
∂ukα
dpkα
dpkα
dt
=
∑
k,α
vkα(p(t))pkα(t) (vkα(p(t))− vk(p(t)))
=
∑
k
Pk
[∑
α
pkα(t)
Pk
v2kα(p(t))− v2k(p(t))
]
≤ 0,(23)
by Jensen’s inequality (recall that
∑
α pkα = Pk). Since this inequality is strict
if all the pkα are positive and vkα 6= vkβ for α 6= β, this proves convergence to
equilibrium when the game only has a unique equilibrium and the game has no
degeneracy.
To get the more general case (and, also, for independent interest), it is much
more instructive to consider as a Lyapunov candidate the relative entropy Hq itself.
Indeed, a simple differentiation gives:
(24)
dHq
dt
= −
∑
k,α
qkα
pkα(t)
dpkα
dt
= −
∑
k,α
qkα
(
vkα(p(t))− vk(p(t))
)
,
and, after rearranging the last term, we get:
(25)
dHq
dt
=
∑
k,α
(pkα(t)− qkα) vkα(p(t)) ≡ −Lq(p(t)),
where
(26) Lq(p) = −
∑
k,α
(pkα − qkα) vkα(p).
We are thus left to show that Lq(p(t)) > 0 and, to that end, the key observation
is that Lq may be interpreted as a directional derivative of Φ. So, let us set f(θ) =
Φ(q+ θz), where θ ≥ 0 and z is a vector in the (solid) tangent cone T cq∆ of ∆ at q:
(27) T cq∆ ≡ {z ∈ Z : zkα ≥ 0 for all α with qkα = 0},
i.e. T cq∆ consists of those tangent directions z ∈ Z which point towards the interior
of ∆ (recall that q might lie on the boundary of ∆). Clearly then, (26) may be
rewritten as:
(28) f ′(θ) =
∑
k,α
∂Φ
∂pkα
∣∣∣∣
q+θz
zkα = θ
−1Lq(q + θz),
for all sufficiently small θ > 0 such that q + θz ∈ ∆.
However, since q is the unique minimum of Φ (a.s.), f(θ) will be convex along
any direction z ∈ T cq∆, so that θf ′(θ) ≥ f(θ) − f(0). Hence, if p = q + θz is an
arbitrary point of ∆, equations (27) and (28) yield the growth estimate:
(29) Lq(p) = θf
′(θ) ≥ f(θ)− f(0) = Φ(p)− Φ(q).
This last estimate shows that Lq(p) ≥ 0 for all p 6= q, thus concluding our proof
of Theorem 8 for the non-degenerate case (note that then Φ(p) − Φ(q) > 0 for all
q 6= p).
To tackle the degenerate case, a semi-definite Lyapunov function (such as the
game’s potential Φ or the relative entropy Hq) is not enough because it ensures
convergence to the set of minimum points and not to an actual point. Clearly, the
replicator dynamics in degenerate games might, in principle, exhibit phenomena of
this kind. However, there is much more at work in (20) than a single semi-definite
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q
∆
∆∗
H−1q (m)
Figure 4. The sets in the proof of Theorem 8.
Lyapunov function: there exists a whole family of such functions, one for each
equilibrium q.11
To take advantage of this, it will be useful to shift our point of view to the evo-
lution function Θ(p, t) of the dynamics (20) which describes the solution trajectory
that starts at p at time t = 0 and which satisfies the consistency condition:
(30) Θ(p, t+ s) = Θ(Θ(p, t), s) for all t, s ≥ 0 and p ∈ ∆.
So, fix some initial condition p ∈ Int(∆) (or, more generally, p ∈ ∆q where ∆q is
the domain of the relative entropy function Hq) and let p(t) = Θ(x, t) be the cor-
responding solution orbit. If q ∈ ∆∗ is Nash, then, in view of the above discussion,
the function Vq(t) ≡ Hq(Θ(p, t)) will be decreasing (though, perhaps, not strictly
so) and will converge to some m ≥ 0 as t→∞. It thus follows that p(t) converges
itself to the level set H−1q (m).
Suppose now that there exists some increasing sequence of times tn → ∞ such
that pn ≡ p(tn) does not converge to the Nash set ∆∗ ≡ ∆∗(G). By compactness
of ∆ (and by descending to a subsequence if necessary), we may assume that pn =
Θ(p, tn) converges to some p
∗ /∈ ∆∗ (but necessarily in H−1q (m)). Hence, for any
t > 0:
(31) Hq(Θ(p, tn + t)) = Hq(Θ(Θ(p, tn), t))→ Hq(Θ(p∗, t)) < Hq(p∗) = m
where the (strict) inequality stems from the fact that H˙q < 0 outside ∆
∗. On the
other hand, Hq(θ(p, tn + t)) = Vq(tn + t)→ m, a contradiction.
Since the sequence tn was arbitrary, this shows that p(t) converges to the set ∆
∗.
So, let q′ be a limit point of p(t) with p(t′n)→ q′ for some sequence of times t′n →∞.
Then, Vq′(t
′
n) = Hq′(p(t
′
n)) will converge to zero and, with Vq′ decreasing, we will
have limt→∞ Vq′(t) = 0 as well. Seeing as Hq′ only vanishes at q′, we conclude that
p(t)→ q′, i.e. every interior trajectory converges to equilibrium.
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